UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, * 18-mc-56-LM

Petitioner, * September 26, 2018

* 10:40 a.m.

V.

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MICHELLE RICCO JONAS,

Respondent.

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TRANSCRIPT OF SHOW CAUSE HEARING
BEFORE MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREA K. JOHNSTONE

Appearances:

For the Petitioner: Seth R. Aframe

US Attorney Office

53 Pleasant Street, 4th Floor

Concord, NH 03301

For the Respondent: Anthony Galdieri (NHAG)

Lawrence Edelman, (NHAG)

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Concord, NH 03301-6397

Court Reporter: Sandra L. Bailey, LCR, CRR

Official Court Reporter

U.S. District Court 55 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301 (603) 225-1454

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: This court is now in session and has before it for consideration a show cause hearing in United States Department of Justice versus Jonas, 18-mc-56-LM.

THE COURT: Okay. For the record if we could have parties and counsel identify themselves, I would appreciate that.

MR. AFRAME: Seth Aframe for the United States Department of Justice.

MR. GALDIERI: Anthony Galdieri for the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office and Ms. Ricco Jonas, program manager at the New Hampshire PDMP.

MR. EDELMAN: And Lawrence Edelman.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. So, counsel for the Attorney General's Office, will both of you be presenting today or will just one of you be presenting.

MR. GALDIERI: It will likely be just myself, your Honor, unless I have a question for --

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. Give me just a minute. I'm trying to sign into my account here. For some reason it's taking a little longer than expected.

Okay, so, I thank everyone for the very thorough briefing that's been provided. It's been extremely helpful to me. I've had a chance to review

all of the materials that have been provided by both sides, and I have some questions. I'm sure that both parties have information and materials that they would like to highlight for the Court as well, but why don't we do this. I'm just going to start by it's the government's motion to compel, so I'm going to allow them to make a presentation. I'll allow you to respond, Attorney Galdieri.

You don't need to reiterate everything that's in your pleadings but there may be things that you want to highlight, and then I, obviously, as I'm sure you can anticipate, have some questions. Okay?

MR. AFRAME: I do think that the pleadings cover what I think is a straightforward legal issue in the case.

I do just want to talk at the outset about some of the things that I saw in my friend's brief about service just so that we're clear on what happened.

THE COURT: Okay, but maybe we don't even need to because from my perspective what happened before this particular subpoena was issued doesn't address, from the Court's perspective, or isn't relevant to the Court's perspective, of the analysis of whether the subpoena at issue, the one that's before me right now is or is not enforceable.

1 MR. AFRAME: Okay. Well, then, I'm happy to 2 turn --

THE COURT: Okay? So, I don't think we need to go there. So, Attorney Galdieri, unless you tell me otherwise, you think there's something about what happened before this subpoena was issued that impacts or requires me to rule in a particular way, I don't want to talk about what happened before the subpoena.

MR. GALDIERI: No, your Honor, that's fine.

THE COURT: All right. So thank you, Attorney Aframe, we can just move right past that.

MR. AFRAME: That's great. Okay, so turning to the merits of what I think what is at issue here, the question I think narrowly before the Court today is what does it mean when we say in the case of contumacy buyer refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person. And what happened here was the United States DEA served an administrative subpoena that's authorized by Section 876(a) on a person that it believes has custody or control over documents that are relevant to an ongoing DEA investigation.

And you've seen the papers. The response to the subpoena was not to comply with the subpoena on various legal grounds that have been presented. And so we're here asking you to enforce the subpoena served to

that person.

THE COURT: Okay. Can I just stop you for a minute. Attorney Galdieri, is it the respondent's position that the DEA investigation is not for an appropriate purpose? Are you challenging the purpose of the investigation?

MR. GALDIERI: No, our claim is limited to the legality of the subpoena and whether or not the DEA has the authority under the CSA to actually subpoena the state, its agencies and its officials as a matter of statutory construction. And from a Fourth Amendment perspective we believe that there are privacy interests, reasonable expectation of privacy in the prescription drug records kept within the PDMP, and that the use of the subpoena cannot extend to those records absent probable cause and warrant.

THE COURT: Okay. So, do you want to just -I know you have other arguments that you will be making,
but can you focus on this argument which seems to be the
biggest one, which is there is privacy interests out
there and there are these Fourth Amendment protections,
and for me to enforce the subpoena would run afoul of
those.

MR. AFRAME: So I have two responses. One is to the extent there are Fourth Amendment protections,

and I think there's a good argument there are not, but to the extent there are, the state's not the one to assert those. The Fourth Amendment interest exists in the people whose records they are, they are not here today. The state is trying to make their arguments for them.

I cited some cases about the parens patriae doctrine in my papers as I was, you know, looking a little bit at it last night. The Supreme Court in, you know, an older case called South Carolina versus

Katzenbach says a state cannot raise a constitutional right, federal constitutional right of its citizens because in the parens patriae doctrine there's two sovereigns at work, the federal sovereign and the state sovereign. The federal sovereign has just as much right and responsibility for its citizens as the state sovereign has. And so it's not an appropriate use of that doctrine to raise Fourth Amendment rights of other people. So I think that's one point.

The second point is this is material that by statute all know is going to be released, and while the state PDMP has one requirement that if it goes to law enforcement the state that says that it needs to have a probable cause showing, there are all sorts of other uses that are set forth in the statute for where this

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    information can be disclosed that doesn't require any
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    kind of probable cause.
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              So, you know, when one releases, there's a
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    third-party records doctrine, when one releases
    information and knows, should know, could know that it's
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    going to be used for all sorts of purposes or could be
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    used for all sorts of purposes, then I think the Fourth
    Amendment interest is significantly diminished.
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              So I think that's our second argument. That
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    there is no Fourth Amendment impediment even if the
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    state could raise that argument, which I don't think
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    they can.
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              THE COURT: Okay. But isn't there also a
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    statutory scheme that contemplates the production of
    those records?
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              MR. AFRAME: Well, so --
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              THE COURT: And doesn't have within it any
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    further protections?
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                           Right. Yes. So the DEA has a
              MR. AFRAME:
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    subpoena provision that doesn't limit, but I do think --
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    so I don't want to make my argument too far, I don't
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    want to run astray. If we did have a citizen here who
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    said the DEA is using its, you know, 876 power and
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    they've got these records of mine and now I'm being
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    prosecuted, and they did that without probable cause,
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could a person raise the Fourth Amendment argument?

Yes. I don't know that it's a complete answer to that

to say, well, we did it by subpoena. That might be part

of the answer. But I don't know -- I just don't want to

take my argument too far.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. AFRAME: But I do think it's significant here that Congress contemplated the DEA would have access to all different kinds of records and they don't need probable cause to do it, and so the argument that I'm positing that some citizen might make is not what's going on here. The state has these records. The state doesn't have a Fourth Amendment interest in them, and the, not the state, but the director won't turn them over.

THE COURT: Okay. So Attorney Galdieri, let me just ask you this on this Fourth Amendment issue.

Doesn't the <u>Sturm Ruger</u> case address this issue where the Court of Appeals has said that Fourth Amendment concerns are satisfied if the agency proves that the subpoena seeks information relevant to an authorized purpose, is adequately described, and was issued in accordance with proper procedures. Doesn't that address the Fourth Amendment concern that you have here?

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MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, the way we understand the constitutional jurisprudence is that an administrative subpoena cannot issue to access records where there is a Fourth Amendment-based reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that is sought, where the Fourth Amendment actually protects the information. THE COURT: But you have a statutory scheme that already exists that contemplates access. MR. GALDIERI: We would argue from our perspective it does not contemplate access of records held by the state. THE COURT: What's your position to that, Attorney Aframe? MR. AFRAME: It does not contemplate records held by the state, I don't agree with that. I don't see any distinction between state records, other records. These are records. 876(a) speaks in broad terms about subpoenaing any records, including books, papers, documents or other tangible things which constitute or contain evidence. Whether they are the state's -whether they are in a state database or some other place, they are in my view covered by that plain language of 876(a). So, no, I don't think it matters that they are in a state database for purposes of

whether there's an authority to use the subpoena.

And so this is a properly done administrative subpoena under the Fourth Amendment, which is what <u>Sturm Ruger</u> says. I think the question that's being raised is if the subpoena is being used to subvert the warrant requirement, then I think you might have, you know, a warrant that requires probable cause. Administrative subpoenas don't require probable cause.

So the question here is, is this some kind of super secret kind of information that should require that I think is what the argument -- I think that's the argument they're making.

THE COURT: Is that the argument you're making, Attorney Galdieri, that the only way to access this information is through a warrant? As I read the statute, it says court order or warrant. And if I enforce the subpoena, isn't that a court order and wouldn't it then be --

MR. GALDIERI: It would have to be a court order based on probable cause under the state statute.

THE COURT: But <u>Sturm Ruger</u> says probable cause is established under the circumstances that have been presented here. You've indicated that you're not challenging the legitimacy of the investigation.

MR. GALDIERI: Well, we are challenging the

legitimacy of the subpoena. We think the subpoena is 1 invalid and it cannot actually issue against the state, 2 3 its agencies or its sovereign. As a matter of statutory 4 construction, the term person as used in the CSA, does 5 not embrace the sovereign states, and the longstanding United States Supreme Court presumption that the term 6 7 person is used in a congressional enactment does not include the sovereign, applies to this statute. 8 the CSA is read as a whole, it's very clear what it 9 10 contemplates. It contemplates cooperative arrangements 11 with state's inner agencies. In Section 873 --12 THE COURT: Are you suggesting that because 13 there's a statute that says that the state and federal 14 government should cooperate with each other that that 15 means they are forbidden from subpoenaing documents? 16 MR. GALDIERI: It means that Congress did not 17 intend in 876 that administrative investigative 18 subpoenas would issue against the state. 19 THE COURT: What's your authority for that? 20 What's your authority for that? I don't read the 21 Controlled Substances Act and that language as saying 22 that at all. If that were the case, wouldn't they have 23 carved out those types of subpoenas from the 24 administrative subpoena function that's in the law? 25 MR. GALDIERI: Well, I think one of the things

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    we have to look at is there is a longstanding
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    presumption that when the word person is used in a
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    congressional enactment, it does not include the
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    sovereign states or the United States.
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              THE COURT: But the subpoena in this case was
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    issued to an individual.
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              MR. GALDIERI: Well, it was issued to Ms.
    Ricco Jonas as the program manager of the New Hampshire
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    PDMP.
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              THE COURT: But she's designated as the person
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    who's the keeper of the record.
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              MR. GALDIERI: She is not considered -- she is
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    a state official. That's who she is. Just like in the
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    Will case, the U.S. Supreme Court said state officials
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    sued in their official capacity, asking them to --
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              THE COURT: She's not being sued.
                                                  There's no
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    lawsuit here. What's your authority that an
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    administrative subpoena is the same thing as commencing
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    a lawsuit? This case is in the docket as a
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    miscellaneous case. It's not the federal government
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    versus the state of New Hampshire.
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              MR. GALDIERI: Well, your Honor, we would make
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    an offer of proof that Ms. Ricco Jonas does not possess
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    and have lawful access to New Hampshire PDMP data in her
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    personal capacity. She only has that access as a state
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    official, and state law constrains her, absent an order
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    based on probable cause issued by a court, to release
    that information. She cannot just voluntarily turn it
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    over without committing at least one state crime, maybe
    other state crimes. So she can't do that under our
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    state law.
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              THE COURT: Are you arguing that if this Court
    were to compel compliance with the subpoena that she
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    would be subject to criminal sanctions?
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              MR. GALDIERI: I think there's a possibility
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    that she could be subject to criminal sanctions. She
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    may have a defense to those criminal sanctions. But I
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    do not --
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              THE COURT: And who's the body or the entity
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    that would be commencing criminal action against Ms.
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    Jonas?
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              MR. GALDIERI: Well, I don't have the answer
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    to that at this time.
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              THE COURT: Is it the Attorney General's
    Office?
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              MR. GALDIERI: But we also have concerns --
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              THE COURT: Is it the Attorney General's
    Office?
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              MR. GALDIERI: It would probably, yes, be the
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    Attorney General's Office.
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records?

THE COURT: What's the likelihood of that happening if the court were to order her to produce the documents, I mean, seriously. MR. GALDIERI: Well, I'm not sure the likelihood would be high if the court ordered her to produce the documents. I'm not sure that's the legal question. THE COURT: So under this situation where there's a federal investigation that you're not challenging the legitimacy of for lack of a better word, and there are records that Ms. Jonas is in the custody and control of, whether it's in her individual or her official capacity, as the Court looking at this administrative subpoena, I'm not sure I need to even reach the issue of whether it was -- she was named in her official or her individual capacity. She is the keeper of those records. That's what she's designated to be responsible for under the statute. So, my question to you is, how are those documents to be accessed in connection with an investigation? What's your process? What do you say the government needs to do in order to get those

MR. GALDIERI: They need to establish probable cause independent of PDMP-kept data and present an

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    order, court order based on probable cause to the PDMP
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    program manager.
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              THE COURT: So how is it that the Sturm Ruger
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    case doesn't address that issue?
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              (Pause.)
              MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, we -- two answers
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    to that. Our first answer is we're not a person within
    Section 876. We don't believe we're a person who can be
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    subpoenaed, who can serve a subpoena, who can have a
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    subpoena enforced against them as a matter of statutory
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              THE COURT: When you say we aren't a person,
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    who's the we?
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              MR. GALDIERI: Ms. Ricco Jonas --
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              THE COURT: Ms. Jonas isn't a person?
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              MR. GALDIERI:
                             The program manager has to
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    release the information. The program manager.
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    program manager, if something happens to her tomorrow, I
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    assume they're going to still want us to enforce the
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    subpoena against the next program manager.
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              MR. AFRAME: I don't agree with that. I think
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    that's made up. We cannot hold someone else in contempt
    for her. If she decides to take a new job tomorrow, we
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    would have to issue a subpoena to the next program
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    manager by their name and ask for those records.
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could not hold someone no longer -- that person would
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    not have control anymore, we could ask you to hold that
    person in contempt, so I don't accept that premise.
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              MR. GALDIERI: And this is why, your Honor,
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    that it is an action against the state. It is the
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    state's information.
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              THE COURT: What's your authority that this is
    an action against the state? I don't have a lawsuit in
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    front of me. I have a subpoena, administrative subpoena
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    in front of me. What authority do you have that you can
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    point me to that says that when an entity, government
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    entity, federal government entity serves a subpoena
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    seeking records that are held by an individual such as
    Ms. Jonas who's designated as the keeper of these
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    records, that that is a lawsuit against the state?
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    just -- I don't have any basis to get to that
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    conclusion. I'm asking you to try to help me to get
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    there.
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              MR. GALDIERI: Well, we would submit, your
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    Honor, that this is a petition to enforce, this is a
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    suit, and that the actual statutory --
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              THE COURT: It's a petition to enforce a
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    subpoena under the discovery rules.
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              MR. GALDIERI: No, it's under Section 876.
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              THE COURT: That's where the authority to
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1 issue the subpoena comes from. But the enforcement 2 mechanism is to say we've issued an administrative subpoena. It hasn't been complied with. Court, compel 3 4 compliance. MR. GALDIERI: Well, your Honor, I would 5 6 suggest in the Al Fayed case this issue was raised with 7 respect to a different statute where the CIA claimed 8 that it was not a person who would have to produce 9 documents in that case pursuant to the statute at issue. I think it was Section 1782. And the DC Circuit court 10 11 agreed and the district court agreed and found that the 12 CIA was not a person --13 THE COURT: But this isn't a subpoena that's 14 been issued -- it's a subpoena that's been issued to the 15 keeper of the records, to the individual who's 16 designated by statute as being responsible for 17 maintaining these records. 18 (Pause.) 19 MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, I think there is a 20 presumption in the case law that when you name an 21 official, a state official in, like Ms. Ricco Jonas's 22 name as the program manager of the New Hampshire PDMP, 23 that the subpoena or the action, whatever it is, is

25 information. It is the state's interest. Can they go

being brought against the state. It is the state's

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and subpoena the governor and ask him to go to the PDMP and get the information out of it? He's in charge of state government.

I mean, from our analysis of the CSA, and this analysis has been applied to other statutory schemes and rule schemes, even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this analysis of whether the authority exists, which in 876 that a person includes the state, whether it includes its officials or its agencies, is a longstanding presumption that the United States Supreme Court applies. And the Ott case and Yousuf case applied it in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. Al Fayed applied it in the context of another statute that's similar to the one we're looking at in Section 876. And we would submit that in determining whether or not there's even authority to issue a subpoena to a state official to get state information when the state is the real party in interest, there has to be authority that comes out of the CSA for that. And it can't be that Ms. Ricco Jonas, just by virtue of being a person, can take information from the state that the state has said it can't be taken, it can't be moved out, take it and give it to the DEA without, I would argue that she doesn't have the authority to do that. I'm not sure she has the authority to do that under the law.

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THE COURT: Attorney Aframe.

MR. AFRAME: This brings us all the way back to the preemption point because the argument is the state won't allow her to release the records. Well, what she's relying on is a provision that can't be applied against a federal subpoena, and that's what the Ninth Circuit case is really about, which I know they didn't want to make that argument, I don't think, because the Ninth Circuit ruled on the preemption point and that probably would have been a start, but we're kind of circling back because what they're saying is she can't turn over the documents because there's a provision in state law that says she needs probable cause to give it to a law enforcement agency. If they had just said that straight out, our answer would have been yes, because of preemption. The supremacy clause says that 876 trumps that because their state rule interferes with the federal attempt under the CSA to get information. And so all they're really saying now is, oh, she's not in control of the records because the state law doesn't let her turn them over, but that provision they're relying on is preempted. So if you get rid of that, of course she can turn them over. There's no impediment.

MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor --

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THE COURT: So address the supremacy clause issue. It wasn't the focal point of either one of your arguments and so I was tempted to start there and say doesn't that end the conversation, but it looks like that's where we ended up right now. So I'm asking you, if that's what you're relying on, she's concerned about the state requirements, there are lots of occasions where folks come in from the Attorney General's office in other places and say we have these state law constraints, and I understand that, which is why I asked you the question of if I compel the production, doesn't that address the other piece of the state law even which says it's a court order or a warrant based on probable cause? MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, we don't agree with the premise that our state law on probable cause requirement is preempted by the supremacy clause. Ninth Circuit, the Utah case, the District of Oregon case never reached the issue of whether a subpoena could issue under 876 to the state or its sovereign agencies or its officials. It never addressed that issue. if that cannot happen under the CSA and there's no --Okay, but if I find, and I'm not THE COURT: saying I'm making this finding, but if I find that there

is no state action, now what? There is no action

1 against the state, now what? What's your argument now? (Pause.) 2 MR. GALDIERI: Well, your Honor, I think our 3 4 argument then becomes it is an improper use of an 5 administrative subpoena under the Fourth Amendment where you have a Fourth Amendment-based reasonable expectation 6 7 of privacy, and the records that are being sought, that 8 is recognized as a constitutional right of privacy, that 9 the warrant requirement applies. 10 THE COURT: And then what's your response to 11 the Sturm Ruger authority in the circuit that says it's 12 met when there's a legitimate investigation? 13 (Pause.) 14 MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, we would reiterate, 15 I'm not entirely familiar with the facts of Sturm Ruger. 16 If that was an administrative subpoena at issue, I mean, 17 our argument is based on our research that an 18 administrative subpoena cannot be used to acquire 19 documentation or information that there's a reasonable 20 Fourth Amendment-based expectation of privacy. have to look more closely at <u>Sturm Ruger</u> to answer your 21 22 question. THE COURT: And I just want to set those 23 24 arguments aside. Under the state law scheme, 25 recognizing and accepting that there may be privacy

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interests in the information, there is still a process
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    by which that information is obtainable. You agree with
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    me, correct?
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              MR. GALDIERI: Correct.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
              MR. GALDIERI: Correct, there's always a
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    process --
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              THE COURT: Despite those privacy interests.
              MR. GALDIERI: Correct.
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              THE COURT: There's a process. And what it
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    appears that folks disagree about is whether the
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    supremacy clause takes away the state's arguments in
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    this case, or whether if I otherwise find that the
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    government's administrative subpoena is appropriate,
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    that they've met whatever the state law requires by
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    issuing an order to compel production of the materials
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    under the subpoena to enforce the subpoena. And what
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    you're telling me is my order, if I were to issue one,
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    authorizing the government's subpoena, ordering that it
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    be complied with, that that does not satisfy the state
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    law requirement for a court order?
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              MR. GALDIERI: If it is a court order that
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    articulated that it is based on probable cause, which I
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    think is what is being indicated, or --
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              THE COURT: I'm -- I've been asking, doesn't
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    Sturm Ruger address that issue for me about probable
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    cause, and if I were to go down that road and say Sturm
    Ruger addresses the probable cause issue, I do the
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    analysis and I find that the subpoena is enforceable and
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    I order that it be complied with, I'm asking you under
    those circumstances why isn't it that -- how is it that
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    it doesn't neatly fit in what the state law requires.
    That's what I'm trying to understand. I'm struggling
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    with that.
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              MR. GALDIERI: I would have to go back and
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    revisit Sturm Ruger --
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. GALDIERI: -- to answer that question
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    fully for you, your Honor. I would say if you go
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    through the analysis and you find an 876 subpoena is
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    issued against the state --
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              THE COURT: I don't think I have to make a
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    finding that it issues against the state. You're
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    presuming that I'm agreeing with you on that issue, and
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    I'm not sure I do.
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              (Pause.)
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              MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, we would just
    reiterate our position that we believe this is really an
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    action against the state, it is a petition to enforce
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    against the state, and that the statute does not
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contemplate these types of subpoenas.

THE COURT: Okay, but if I don't get there, if I disagree with you on that analysis -- I'm looking at your objection to the petition to compel compliance with the administrative subpoena and I'm on page six. It's right in the middle of the page. And you indicate here right in the middle it says the legislation also authorized the board to disclose PDMP data to authorized law enforcement officials on a case-by-case basis for the purpose of investigation and prosecution of a criminal offense when presented with a court order based on probable cause. No law enforcement agency or official shall have direct access to the program.

So my question to you is, if the court finds that the <u>Sturm Ruger</u> case provides First Circuit authority, federal authority that the government has established probable cause and I otherwise find that the administrative subpoena has been properly sought, for lack of a better word, or issued based, on what federal law says I'm supposed to analyze an administrative subpoena under, then if I issue an order compelling compliance with the subpoena, am I not squarely in 318-B:35, I(b)(3)? So we don't even have a violation, alleged violation or issue with state law. It's consistent.

MR. GALDIERI: Yet, your Honor, if that is what you find in your order, yes, that order I believe would be consistent if that is what you find based on your analysis without conceding any appellate rights.

THE COURT: Okay. And I understand that your -- what you're telling the Court is the reason I can't get to this place is because the subpoena in this case is an action against the state.

MR. GALDIERI: Yes. You cannot get -- it is a subpoena that is directed to the state. There's no authorization in the CSA 876 to direct subpoenas to the state -- to the state, their agencies or their officials to command them to produce records under the CSA for the purposes of an investigation.

THE COURT: So you're taking that to its logical conclusion in what you're saying is the only way for law enforcement, whether it's state or federal law enforcement, to access these records is with what? How would they get these records? What's your alternative theory for how they would get them?

MR. GALDIERI: So they go out and they do investigative work that gives them, generates probable cause. They come and they get a court order based on probable cause and ask to access the data. The statutory scheme contemplates that, it doesn't

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contemplate that law enforcement investigations start
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    with the PDMP, so that law enforcement --
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              THE COURT: I don't think -- there's an
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    affidavit here I think that suggests that's not what's
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    happening. They've done an investigation and they're in
    the place where they are subpoenaing those records as
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    part of their investigation.
              So your position is, short of getting a
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    warrant they can't access these records. That's your
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    position.
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              MR. GALDIERI: That's correct.
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              THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful to me.
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    Thank you, I appreciate that very much.
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              All right, I've interrupted folks and so what
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    I want to do is give both sides an opportunity to just
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    regroup, take a few minutes. I think you sort of
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    understand my thought process and where I'm having some,
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    I needed some additional information, so I'm going to
    just let you think about how you want to sum up, if
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    there's anything you want to highlight for me. If you
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    want to take a few minutes, if you have the Sturm Ruger
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    case handy and you want to take a quick look at it, I'm
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    happy to do that too.
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              MR. GALDIERI: Sure.
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              THE COURT: All right?
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1 MR. AFRAME: Take a few minutes? 2 THE COURT: Yes, just stretch your legs, take 3 a few minutes. Why don't you come back in ten minutes. 4 All right? 5 (Recess.) THE COURT: Okay, so I did tell you that I was 6 7 going to give you an opportunity to wrap up and highlight things for me, but I actually have two loose 8 9 ends, and they may be the same loose ends that you were 10 planning on addressing, and so you can tell me you were 11 just going to plan on addressing those in your closing 12 remarks. 13 So the first question I have is for Attorney 14 Galdieri. We talked a little bit about, you know, we 15 were talking about a scenario where there was a warrant 16 issued based on probable cause, and so my question for 17 you is, in that scenario am I correct in assuming that 18 it would be Ms. Ricco Jonas or some other individual 19 that holds her position if she wasn't that individual, that would be facilitating the compliance with the 20 21 warrant? 22 MR. GALDIERI: Yes, that's my understanding. 23 THE COURT: Okay. All right. And so the 24 other question I have is really a question for both of 25 you and it goes back to the Sturm Ruger case that talks about what satisfies the Fourth Amendment.

And so if the Fourth Amendment is satisfied, am I correct that that subsumes within it probable cause. All right? So those are my questions.

MR. AFRAME: So, I mean, the Fourth Amendment
-- so I don't know what the state's action means. I
mean, you know, the state has to address probable cause.

THE COURT: Sure, yes.

MR. AFRAME: The Fourth Amendment doesn't always require probable cause. It requires probable cause for a warrant.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. AFRAME: Warrant shall issue on probable cause. This is an administrative subpoena. It's technically -- it's not a search. It's a request for documents. And I think that the notion is <u>Sturm Ruger</u>, especially where these documents are documents that are in the possession of a third party, there's no reason that an administrative subpoena can't be used for those things, and the Fourth Amendment is satisfied because this is not a search. The warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply. And the standard under <u>Sturm Ruger</u> for satisfying the Fourth Amendment is met.

Now, if there's a probable cause requirement under the state law, that's back to preemption because

1 the Fourth Amendment is satisfied. So there's no 2 federal impediment to enforcing the federal statute, 3 because the only way they can get around supremacy 4 issues is to say there's some federal impediment to 5 stopping the federal government from using its authority 6 under 876(c). Well, what would trump a federal statute? 7 A federal Constitution. But the federal Constitution is met because this is not a search. The warrant 8 9 requirement does not apply. The Fourth Amendment is satisfied. 10 11 Their law says probable cause. Now, I can't 12 tell you if they mean by probable cause Fourth Amendment 13 probable cause, but I'll assume they do. If they're 14 engrafting their own desire for additional protections 15 that the federal Constitution does not impose, that's 16 preempted because that interferes with what the federal 17 government's doing. 18 THE COURT: Very good. Attorney Galdieri. 19 MR. GALDIERI: Your Honor, our response to 20 that is that we have argued that it is the Fourth 21 Amendment's probable cause standard. We believe our 22 state statute encapsulates that by requiring probable 23 cause. It's really a reflection of what the Fourth 24 Amendment requires.

And we read the Sturm Ruger case to say that

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in the course of resisting an administrative subpoena, the Fourth Amendment is available to the challenger as a defense against enforcement of the subpoena. And we believe those Fourth Amendment interests are at issue here. A person -- New Hampshire residents have a Fourth Amendment-based reasonable expectation of privacy in their PDMP kept data. The state has recognized that in the law and has protected it. And there is federal case law that recognizes that prescription drug records, a subset of medical records, are highly private in nature, and there are circuit courts that recognize that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in those records.

The <u>Douglas</u> case from the Tenth Circuit, the

<u>Doe</u> case from the Third Circuit, and United States

Supreme Court has recognized that there is a Fourth

Amendment-based reasonable expectation of privacy in

medical records, in <u>Whalen versus Roe</u> and <u>Ferguson</u>

<u>versus City of Charleston</u>. And in the Seventh Circuit,

or the First Circuit, excuse me, has even recently in

<u>Eil versus U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration</u> in 2017,

commented on the -- that persons have significant

interests in their medical records which the First

Circuit has described previously as highly personal and

intimate in nature.

We do not read Sturm Ruger to say that a

Fourth Amendment defense through an administrative subpoena cannot be raised.

THE COURT: All right. You're all set on that? I'm going to turn it over to you, Attorney Aframe, for further response.

MR. AFRAME: So I suppose, when he says Fourth Amendment defense, he's saying that the no warrant, what the Fourth Amendment says, of course, is the right of the people in their papers against unusual searches and seizures so as not to be violated and no warrant shall issue upon probable cause.

Well, we're not seeking a warrant. That's pretty much, that's established, we're using administrative subpoena. I suppose the question that he's raising is can we use an administrative subpoena to get records that are within the PDMP or are we required to use a warrant. I think that's the argument that's being made. And I think that common experience tells us that subpoenas are commonly used for medical records. Grand jury subpoenas issue all the time to hospitals for records. We don't say you need a search warrant to go to Dartmouth-Hitchcock and get a file.

Congress obviously understood that because they then passed HIPAA, and HIPAA as you know is a complicated regulatory scheme that decides when and,

when you can and cannot get records from third-party health care entities. That's, you know, so, you don't need a warrant, you need to comply with the statutory regime, you know, in certain circumstances, but that has nothing to do with whether you need a subpoena or a warrant.

So, I would suggest to you that when records, I'm not going to disagree that they're not personal records, of course they are, but when they are released to third parties, that warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply. And I think if you look at the PDMP statute you will see that it has many, many different ways that someone's records can be released to different entities without there being probable cause. Their own statute says you can give it to the Board of Medicine. You can give it to other different entities without probable cause.

So, when you release records, and you understand that they're then going to end up in this database and then they can end up in all sorts of different places, that just doesn't comport when the warrant requirement would apply.

So the bottom line here is that the warrant requirement does not apply. We are dealing with the part of the Fourth Amendment that says the right of the

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people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable
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    searches and seizures shall not be violated. And what
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    Sturm Ruger says is that part of the Fourth Amendment is
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    satisfied so long as an administrative subpoena meets
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    the requirements laid out here. And I don't think
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    there's any dispute that they don't.
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              So, that's why I think Sturm Ruger's
    controlling, because the warrant requirement does not
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    apply.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Attorney
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    Galdieri.
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              MR. GALDIERI: Just one piece of information
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    about the state statutory scheme and how it works.
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    state statutory scheme is in place to benefit the health
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    and welfare of patients in the medical profession. It's
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    not a law enforcement tool.
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              THE COURT: Well, I think there is an aspect
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    of it that also addresses that the materials are
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    recognized that they would be used in law enforcement
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    activity.
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              Am I reading that incorrectly?
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              MR. GALDIERI: They are used in -- PDMP
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    materials are only used with respect to law enforcement
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    if there is a court order based on probable cause.
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              THE COURT: Well, then that was contemplated
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when the scheme was put in place. It wasn't simply for use by a health care professionals. It recognizes that the materials could be used by law enforcement in investigations as well.

MR. GALDIERI: That if a warrant based on probable cause or a court order based on probable cause came in, yes, I think that is the expectation generally in our society that that information would then be turned over, but not through an administrative subpoena.

And what happens within the New Hampshire
Pharmacy Board is this information is used to
investigate health care providers and to look at whether
there is professional misconduct and to appropriately
discipline or bring action against them. It's not to
investigate patients. It's not to reveal patient
information to the world, or even to these boards. The
boards don't need to necessarily know anything about the
patients. And that is part of why the PDMP is kept
separate from law enforcement and still has a probable
cause requirement attached to law enforcement requiring
records pursuant to --

THE COURT: But it's 318-B:33 that requires prescribers and dispensers to identify patient names, addresses, dates of birth and phone numbers. That's part of what they're required to submit to the database.

MR. GALDIERI: Sure. There is a component to this where physicians and prescribers when they input information into the system, and that information goes into the system into the PDMP, and then the PDMP is used by the Board of Pharmacy to investigate and make sure compliance is maintained by health care professionals, by dispensers, by prescribing physicians. It's not a tool to be used to begin law enforcement investigations against patients.

MR. AFRAME: Can I make a comment on that?

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. AFRAME: So that's a misunderstanding what the reasonable expectation privacy standard's all about. It's not a question of is it about do we want to prolong for purposes. The reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz is a subjective and objective standard. And objectively this information under this statute can go to a lot of different places. That's what's important. It can go to the Board of Dentistry, the Board of Medicine, the Board of Nursing, the Board of Registration. I'm sure they have good purposes for it. But the point is when you go to a doctor, when you go to the pharmacy, you turn over your script, that script's going into a database, and that database is going to be available to third parties. Once it's available to

third parties, that reasonable expectation of privacy that would trigger the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment is lost.

an opportunity to respond, Attorney Galdieri, but I'm also looking at New Hampshire RSA 318-B:34. And it specifically states in paragraph one that, it certainly suggests that patient information can be disclosed when it's authorized by state or federal law. And I understand your arguments as they relate to whether the subpoena is an action against the state and some of those other issues, but the notion that this database was created and it wasn't contemplated that law enforcement would have access through an administrative subpoena to access this information if the subpoena were otherwise lawfully issued, I mean, this seems to suggest exactly that, that there would be an opportunity for that.

Am I reading this section incorrectly?

MR. GALDIERI: The way I read this section,

your Honor, in Roman I is it specifically states that

the information contained in the program is not subject

to discovery subpoena or other means of legal compulsion

for release and shall not be shared with an agency or

institution except as provided in the subdivision. This

paragraph shall not prevent a practitioner from using or disclosing program information about a patient to others who are authorized by state or federal law or regulations to receive program information.

So, going to a practitioner and getting that information is not forbidden. But there are certain enhanced protections when the state or any government agency is going to start collecting mass amounts of personally identifiable private information about persons into a database. And we believe that the information in the database is subject to the protections, and state officials cannot just give it out. It becomes in a sense the cookie jar, the easy starting place, and that is what the New Hampshire State Legislature --

THE COURT: But these facts don't -- under these facts this is not a case where there's a starting place. We have an affidavit that indicates there's an ongoing investigation. And you haven't challenged the sufficiency that there is in fact an investigation.

MR. GALDIERI: Well, we understand that there is an investigation. We understand from the declaration that information may have been received by the DEA from the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy. It is our position, the position of our office that if that

information included PDMP data, that that was inappropriate and improper under the statutory regime.

THE COURT: Attorney Aframe.

MR. AFRAME: So I think the section you pointed, the sentence you point out is very important to the analysis that I think applies here.

So, New Hampshire as a matter of public policy, its own decision, it's how it wants to deal with its PDMP data, has decided that if a state officer wants to come and get PDMP information, they're going to have to follow this state requirement under state law, and that's a matter for New Hampshire to figure out. What we're figuring out here is what does the federal Constitution Fourth Amendment require. And my position is that what needs to happen if the state were to have any traction here, they would have to prove to you that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies. The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment only applies to things over which there's a reasonable expectation of privacy.

This sentence that you point out says that a doctor cannot say in response to a subpoena, guess what, I'm not going to turn over the subpoena. You know why? Because it also belongs in the PDMP database. And the PDMP database has all these rules that New Hampshire has

put in place because it wants to, and so I'm not going to comply with this subpoena.

What this says is, no, you do have to comply with the subpoena. Well, what does that mean? That means there's no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information because in addition to your doctor turning it over to the PDMP, he or she is going to have to turn it over to whatever subpoenas come from, the grand jury or other places where, you know, administrative subpoenas that might be issued.

So, that just says to us that, sure, New Hampshire's put a whole bunch of regulatory rules that they want their state officers to comply with. We as a federal government have no stake in that matter. But we as a federal government have our own set of authorities, and our question is can we enforce those authorities. And as I said before, the only impediment to us doing that is the federal Constitution. And that Fourth Amendment, there are two parts to it. Does the warrant requirement apply I think is the issue here, and it doesn't.

And so when you're dealing with the first part of the Fourth Amendment, we've met that. And I think this sentence that you point out goes into the analysis as to why people do not have that reasonable expectation

of privacy under <u>Katz</u> such that the warrant requirement applies, because they know that this information could be released in all sorts of different ways aside from it being released to the PDMP.

THE COURT: Okay. Attorney Galdieri.

MR. GALDIERI: I'll just add people don't voluntarily give their information over to the PDMP. People seek medical treatment, medical treatment that they need. They need prescriptions, sometimes to stay alive and prolong their life, and that information is required by law to be put into the PDMP. To say that a patient doesn't have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they walk into the doctor's office to get that treatment of their condition will be available, there's no reasonable expectation of privacy over them, I don't think that position sounds well against the reality of what occurs. And nearly every federal court who has addressed the issue has found these records are highly private and highly intimate, and many have found that they invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

THE COURT: But we have cases that have been provided to the Court that have looked at PDMP records in other parts of the country and have enforced administrative subpoenas in the face of not exactly the same arguments you're making, but awfully similar.

MR. GALDIERI: So we have a Ninth Circuit opinion that has reversed on standing grounds of intervenors who tried to intervene in a court action for declaratory judgment. It was found that they didn't have standing. The Ninth Circuit recognized expressly at the end of its opinion that the state, through an action to enforce the subpoena, could raise these important privacy interests at a hearing such as the one we're here at today. And we believe that the Utah district court cases incorrectly decided, that the Douglas case in the Tenth Circuit controls, and the Tenth Circuit case in Douglas preceded the Utah case and establishes that individuals have a reasonable Fourth Amendment- based expectation of privacy in their prescription drug records.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. AFRAME: That would mean, I mean, and I'm not aware of a case, maybe this case says it, but to get medical records from a hospital you couldn't use a trial subpoena, you couldn't use a grand jury subpoena, you would have to use a search warrant to get medical records from any of the many, many medical providers that are out there. You would not need HIPAA if you had such a scheme because you would have had the probable cause requirement as we all know is a difficult

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    requirement, probably one of the most difficult to get
    information that there is in the law.
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              So, I'm not aware of a case that says and my
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    own practice tells me you don't need a case to get
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    medical records. So the argument's made that somehow
    because the state aggregates the same information, so
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    instead I have to go to Dartmouth-Hitchcock and here and
    there to get it, I can just go to one place, changes the
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    analysis. I'm not aware of any law that says that
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    because this information, while private, of course it's
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    private, but private does not equal warrant, and that's
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    the argument I think that's being made, and so -- I
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    think that's the bottom line. A warrant requirement
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    doesn't apply. I think I've explained why. That takes
    us back to the Fourth Amendment. Sturm Ruger applies,
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    Sturm Ruger steps are satisfied, the Fourth Amendment's
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    been satisfied, therefore there's no federal impediment
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    to enforcing our federal law that preempts whatever in
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    the state law is inconsistent.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Attorney
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    Galdieri?
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              MR. GALDIERI: No, I don't think so, your
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    Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So, this was very helpful
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    to me. Thank you. You've answered my questions very
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I'm going to take this under advisement. I'll 1 well. 2 try to issue a ruling as quickly as I can, there'll be a 3 written order, okay, a report and recommendation. 4 thank you. MR. AFRAME: Thank you. 5 6 MR. EDELMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 7 (Hearing concluded.) 8 9 10 11 12 CERTIFICATE 13 14 I, Sandra L. Bailey, do hereby certify that 15 the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate 16 transcription of the within proceedings, to the best of 17 my knowledge, skill, ability and belief. 18 19 20 Submitted: 10/5/2018 SANDRA L. BAILEY, LCR, CM, CRR 21 LICENSED COURT REPORTER, NO 22 STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 23 24 25